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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Appellee,

:

v.

:

MARK EDWARD McGRATH,

;

Case No. 920492-CA

Priority No. 2

Defendant-Appellant. :
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant-Appellant Mark Edward McGrath (McGrath)
appeals his conviction for theft by receiving stolen property, a
second degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-408
(Supp. 1993), 76-6-412(1) (1990), upon jury trial in the Third
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, Utah, the
Honorable Richard H. Moffat, presiding.

This Court has appellate

jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (f) (Supp. 1993) .
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
McGrath presents seven issues for appellate review.
The State reframes those issues slightly, as follows:
1.

Did the Trial Court Properly Reject McGrath's

Pretrial Motion to Dismiss, Which Was Based Upon a State "Speedy
Disposition" Statute for Charges Brought Against a Defendant Who
is Already Incarcerated?

As framed in this case, this question

is one of statutory interpretation, reviewed without deference to
the trial court's judgment.
(Utah 1991) .

State

v. Petersen,

810 P.2d 421, 424

2.

Does McGrath's Challenge to the Sufficiency of the

Evidence Supporting the Guilty Verdict Fail for Lack of Proper
Appellate Analysis?

By its nature, this is a question considered

de novo by the appellate court. A jury verdict will be set aside
on appeal only if the evidence, viewed favorably to the verdict,
is so inconclusive or inherently improbable that a reasonable
doubt must have been entertained of the defendant's guilt.

State

v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1212 (Utah 1993).
3.

Should McGrath's Claim of "Extensive and Pervasive

Prosecutorial Misconduct," to Which No Objection Was Raised at
Trial, be Rejected for His Failure to Prove "Plain Error"?
Because no "prosecutor misconduct" argument was made at trial, a
high barrier must be crossed to permit its consideration on
appeal:

besides proving error, the appellant must prove that

such error was both obvious and prejudicial to his or her cause.
Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208-09.
4.

Did the Trial Court Properly Deny McGrath's

Mistrial Motion, Against His Argument that the Jury Had Been
Exposed to Non-Record Evidence During its Early Deliberations?

A

trial court's decision to deny a mistrial motion is deferentially
reviewed, reversed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion.
State v. Speer,
5.

750 P.2d 186, 190 (Utah 1988).
Should McGrath's "Counsel Ineffectiveness11

Arguments be Rejected for Lack of Record Support, and Because
They Otherwise Are Not Properly Analyzed on Appeal?

As with

Issue Two, above, this is a question reviewed de novo by the
2

appellate court.

In the interest of the finality of criminal

judgments, a "counsel ineffectiveness" argument, like one of
"plain error," poses a high barrier for the complaining
Strickland

defendant.

(1984); Parsons

v. Washington,

v. Barnes,

P.2d

466 U.S. 668, 693-94
,

, 230 Utah Adv. Rep.

3, 5-6 (Utah 1994).
6.

Did the Trial Court Properly Overrule McGrath's

Objection to Testimony that After His Arrest, McGrath Threatened
an Important Prosecution Witness?

As a question of evidentiary

relevance and unfair prejudice under Rules 401-404, Utah Rules of
Evidence, it is reviewed on appeal with deference to the trial
court.

Bambrough v. Bethers,

State v. Hamilton,
v. O'Neil,
denied,

552 P.2d 1286, 1290 (Utah 1976);

827 P.2d 232, 239-40 (Utah 1992).

Cf.

State

848 P.2d 694, 698-99 & nn. 4, 5 (Utah App.), cert.

859 P.2d 585 (Utah 1993).
7.

Did the Trial Court Properly Remedy its Initially

Flawed Jury Instruction on the Elements of the Offense, thereby
Preventing Reversible Error?

Because defense counsel acquiesced

in the remedy provided by the trial court, appellate review of
this question should be conducted under the "plain error"
standard of State

v. Dunn, described in Issue Three, above.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The statutory "speedy disposition" rule, Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-29-1 (1990), is copied in appendix I of this brief and is
also set forth in McGrath's Brief of Appellant at 13-14.

A

criminal defendant's right to assistance of counsel, U.S. CONST.
3

AMEND.

VI, is familiar.

Other pertinent provisions will be cited

and set forth as necessary in the main text of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
While on parole for prior felonies, McGrath was
arrested for suspected involvement in a robbery and theft, as
well as violation of his parole terms, and returned to the Utah
State Prison.

Eventually he was charged by information with

aggravated robbery or, in the alternative, theft by receiving
stolen property, as well as possession of a dangerous weapon by a
restricted person.

After a preliminary hearing, the first and

last of these charges were dismissed (R. 8-11).
Upon jury trial, McGrath was found guilty of theft by
receiving, a second degree felony owing to the finding that the
stolen property was valued at over one thousand dollars, Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (1) (a) (i) (1990) (R. 233). Accordingly, he
was sentenced to a term of one to fifteen years at the Utah State
Prison, to be served concurrently with the sentences for his
prior felony convictions (R. 241).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Consistent with settled appellate practice, e.g.,

State

v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1205 (Utah 1993), the State recites the
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict.

On the

morning of January 29, 1991, Stephanie Vert was robbed at
gunpoint, by a person identified as Cory Brooks, in the West
Valley City home that she shared with her mother, Martha Vert (R.
430, 436, 439) . From the Vert home, Brooks stole jewelry valued
4

around six to seven thousand dollars, including a distinctive
"marquise" diamond ring (R. 432-33) -1 While completing the
crime, Brooks spoke by walkie-talkie with an accomplice,
arranging to be picked up outside the home (R. 437).
That evening, McGrath drove Brooks to visit Rodney
Langenbacker at Langenbacker's home.

There Brooks displayed and

offered to sell a collection of jewelry, including a marquise
diamond ring (R. 444-47, 467). Rodney Langenbacker later drew
pictures of several of the items displayed by Brooks, which
matched items on a list drawn up by the Verts of the jewelry
stolen during the robbery (R. 446-47).
Rodney Langenbacker's brother, Curtis, came to the home
and also viewed the jewelry in Brooks' possession (R. 464, 472).
Curtis, who described himself as a jeweler, took the marquise
diamond ring and departed, believing that he had a buyer for it
(R. 465, 469, 472-74).

Curtis was unable to sell the ring,

however, and later returned it to Brooks, again riding in a car
driven by McGrath, at another location (R. 483-84) .
McGrath was a relatively passive participant in the
Langenbacker visit, remaining outside in his truck during much of
the time; he did not openly discuss the jewelry (R. 451, 467).
He did enter the Langenbacker home for a few minutes to mumble

brooks was separately tried and convicted of aggravated
robbery, aggravated burglary, and possession of a dangerous weapon
by a restricted person for the Vert robbery; those convictions were
affirmed by this Court in State
v. Brooks,
868 P.2d 818 (Utah
App.), petition
for cert, filed,
No. 940146, 235 Utah Adv. Rep. 71
(Utah March 22, 1994).
5

something to Brooks. According to Rodney Langenbacker's wife,
McGrath then asked her for directions to another address, and
departed (R. 452, 462). At McGrath's trial, Mr. and Mrs.
Langenbacker were shown a photograph of, and readily identified,
the truck driven by McGrath that evening (R. 44 6, 4 60).2
During Brooks' and McGrath's visit, the Langenbackers
heard a news broadcast about the Vert robbery (R. 444-45, 461).
This caused them to suspect that Brooks and McGrath had been
involved in the robbery (R. 451, 463). When Brooks departed the
next morning after an overnight stay with the Langenbackers, Mrs.
Langenbacker called the police to report that suspicion (R. 45556, 464). When the police came to their home, the Langenbackers
gave them a necklace, left behind from the collection displayed
by Brooks (R. 458, 462-63) . Martha Vert identified the necklace
as one of the items stolen in the Vert robbery (R. 431, 434).
Mrs. Langenbacker identified McGrath from a photo array
provided by police during the robbery investigation (R. 470). A
couple of days later, having evidently learned of her call to the
police, McGrath telephoned Mrs. Langenbacker and threatened her,

2

A neighbor also testified at McGrath's trial that he observed
a similar truck in the Vert neighborhood on the evening before the
robbery. A man resembling Brooks alighted from the truck and
entered the Vert home, while another individual remained in the
truck (R. 486-87). This was consistent with Brooks' visit to the
Verts on the evening before the robbery, ostensibly to view the
marquise diamond ring, which the Verts had advertised for sale.
State v. Brooks, 868 P.2d at 819.
Owing to divorce, Mrs. Langenbacker's last name had changed at
the time of McGrath's trial (R. 459).
6

11

[t]elling me if I don't keep my mouth shut, he would make sure

it was permanently shut" (R. 470).
A pawnshop operator testified that one week before the
Vert robbery, a woman had purchased a Colt semi-automatic pistol
from him.

During this transaction, the woman was "coached" by

two men, causing the pawnshop operator to believe that the pistol
was actually purchased for their use (R. 496-98).

At McGrath's

trial, robbery victim Stephanie Vert viewed a picture of the Colt
pistol, and testified that it looked like the weapon used by
Brooks during the robbery (R. 436).
The pistol-purchasing woman was Glenda Steadman.

At

McGrath's trial, Steadman admitted that the men who assisted her
with the purchase were Brooks and McGrath; McGrath drove the trio
to the pawnshop, and also provided the money for the weapon.
However, Steadman claimed that she had purchased the pistol for
herself--McGrath loaned her the money, she said--and that neither
Brooks nor McGrath had ever handled the weapon (R. 507-09, 518).
Steadman then testified that upon taking the pistol home, she
promptly lost it, and never saw it again (R. 518-19).
But Steadman's testimony conflicted in part with
statements she had made during the robbery investigation.

One

officer recalled that Steadman reported purchasing the pistol and
giving it to McGrath (R. 541-43),

Debbie Gale, Steadman's

roommate at the time of the purchase, also recalled that Steadman
said that she had given the weapon to McGrath (R. 544, 549).
Also, police had recorded a telephone call placed to them by
7

Steadman in March 1991, during the investigation (R. 582-83) . In
the taped conversation, edited and replayed at McGrath's trial,
Steadman indicated that she had given the pistol to McGrath (R.
567, 584, 183-86).
Debbie Gale also testified that in February 1991, she
spoke to McGrath about Brooks' arrest for the Vert robbery.
According to Gale, McGrath stated that Brooks had "goofed up."
Gale related that McGrath also described an effort to "melt down"
the jewelry--an effort associated with the post-robbery visit and
jewelry display at the Langenbacker home (R. 550-52, 560-61) .
To counter the foregoing State's evidence, McGrath,
through counsel, called various witnesses in his defense.

Two of

these witnesses opined that State's witness Debbie Gale was a
liar (R. 616, 646). Other witnesses gave alibi testimony,
purporting to place McGrath elsewhere when State's witnesses had
him participating in the pistol purchase, and around the time of
the Vert robbery (R. 598-603, 626-41, 647-52, 663-66).3
In the end, the jury resolved the evidentiary conflicts
in the State's favor, and found McGrath guilty of theft by
receiving (R. 233, 727). Facts that are more particular to

3

Dana Barlow was McGrath's girl friend at the time of the Vert
robbery, and testified that McGrath spent the evenings and nights
of January 28-29, 1991 with her (R. 599-603).
However, the
prosecutor noted that Barlow's address was within ten blocks of the
Verts' home (R. 719) . During her testimony Barlow related that she
began dating McGrath "when he got out of prison this last time" (R.
599, 604) . This statement, not emphasized by the prosecutor, was
not objected to at trial, and is not assigned as error on appeal.
8

McGrath's arguments on appeal will be set forth under the
pertinent argument points of this brief.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

McGrath's pretrial motion to dismiss, based upon

his statutory "speedy disposition" argument, was correctly
denied.

When McGrath filed his request for disposition of the

charges related to the Vert robbery, no charges had been filed.
Therefore, under Utah precedent and as a matter of sound policy,
that request did not start the 120-day time period running for
disposition of charges.
II.

McGrath's challenge to the sufficiency of the

evidence supporting the guilty verdict fails because on appeal,
he fails to marshal and address the evidence supporting the
verdict, as required by Utah appellate policy; rather, McGrath
simply reasserts his unsuccessful trial argument.

There was, in

fact, sufficient evidence to find that the elements of theft by
receiving had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
III.

McGrath's vaguely-formulated, two-part claim of

"prosecutor misconduct" fails.

That claim was not preserved by

objection at trial, and McGrath has not proven "plain error" in
the prosecutor's handling of the case.

To prove theft by

receiving, evidence that the jewelry displayed by Brooks and
McGrath had been stolen was relevant and not unduly inflammatory;
the "error" element of plain error therefore is unmet for the
first part of McGrath's claim.

Glenda Steadman's statements,

prior to trial, that she had purchased the apparent robbery
9

weapon and given it to McGrath, were also admissible as
substantive evidence because they conflicted with her account of
events during McGrath's trial; the error element of plain error
therefore also fails on this part of McGrath's "prosecutor
misconduct" claim.
3CV. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying McGrath's mistrial motion, made when it was learned that
a transcript of Steadman's prior-to-trial inconsistent statements
had been tciken to the jury room during deliberations.

This

inadvertent act did not constitute reversible error because the
transcript could have been formally admitted into evidence under
the rules of evidence.

In fact, by giving an "impeachment only"

instruction to the jury on the transcript's use, the trial court
gave McGrath an advantage to which he was not entitled.

The

trial court also properly determined that the transcript was not
"extraneous" evidence forbidden to the jury.
V.

McGrath's argument that trial counsel ineffectively

represented him must also be rejected.

McGrath's affidavit to

this Court, alleging that counsel improperly barred him from
testifying in his own defense, cannot be accepted as part of the
record on appeal, defeating this part of his ineffectiveness
argument.

McGrath's assertion that trial counsel blundered by

failing to object to certain evidence can be rejected for failure
to properly brief it on appeal; it also fails because McGrath has
not demonstrated that counsel transgressed the wide boundaries of
professionally acceptable representation.
10

VI.

The trial court legitimately admitted evidence of

McGrath's telephoned threat to Mrs. Langenbacker, made after she
reported McGrath's suspected involvement in the Vert robbery to
the police.

That threat was a relevant "other act," tending to

prove that McGrath knew that the jewelry displayed by Cory Brooks
had been stolen.

The threat was also far less inflammatory than

the defendant comments held inadmissible in the Utah case that
McGrath relies upon in this appeal.
VII.

Finally, McGrath has not proven "plain error" in

connection with the trial court's remedy, acquiesced in by trial
counsel, of a jury instruction that erroneously included weapon
possession as an element of theft by receiving.

Ironically,

McGrath had a higher likelihood of acquittal had the instruction
not been corrected to delete the weapon possession element;
therefore, McGrath cannot complain of reversible prejudice
stemming from the remedy that was provided.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REJECTED McGRATH'S
STATUTORY "SPEEDY DISPOSITION"-BASED MOTION
TO DISMISS
In his first point on appeal, McGrath argues that the
theft by receiving charge should have been dismissed with
prejudice, because it was not resolved within the 120-day time
limit of Utah's "speedy disposition" statute, Utah Code Ann. §
77-29-1 (1990) (fully set forth in appendix I of this brief and
in Br. of Appellant at 13-14).

As presented in this case, this
11

point involves only statutory construction, decided without
deference to the trial court.
424 (Utah 1991).
A.

State

v. Petersen,

810 P.2d 421,

Even so, McGrath's argument fails.

Procedural Background.
McGrath was arrested for parole violation and for his

apparent involvement in the Vert robbery on February 21, 1991,
and returned to prison on the former violation (parole revocation
documents are also copied in appendix I).

As provided in section

77-29-1, McGrath filed a demand for disposition of charges with
the prison warden in March 1991.

That demand alleged that

unspecified "[c]harges are now pending against me in the court
(s) of Salt Lake County

West Valley City . . .," and asked that

it be forwarded "to the appropriate authorities . . . "

(copied in

appendix I of this brief and at R. 82).
However, McGrath was not formally charged with crimes
related to the Vert robbery until the criminal information was
filed in August 1991 (R. 8-11).

Sometime in December 1991, after

his preliminary hearing, McGrath was bound over for trial on the
theft by receiving charge related to the Vert robbery (R. 8-9,
23-24) . On February 6, 1992, McGrath moved to dismiss the theft
by receiving charge under section 77-29-1 (R. 80), on the
strength of his March 1991 disposition demand.4

After a

hearing, the trial court denied the motion (R. 100-02).
4

Through
counsel,
McGrath
expressly
disclaimed
any
constitutional "speedy trial" basis for his motion: "We've not
raised the speedy trial issue at all. The only issue we've raised
is the limited issue of the statute and it[]s 120 day application.
That's it" (R. 310).
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B.

Because McGrath's Request for Disposition Was
Premature, the "Speedy Disposition" Statute Was
Not Triggered.
Citing State

v. Petersen,

810 P.2d 421 (Utah 1991),

McGrath complains that the nearly fifteen-month period between
filing his disposition demand and the start of his trial, of
which the last ten months elapsed after the information was
filed, was "not supported by good cause" under subsection (4) of
the speedy disposition statute, and therefore requires dismissal
of the theft by receiving charge.

However, McGrath overlooks the

earlier subsection (1) of section 77-29-1, not addressed in
Petersen, which prescribes how the 120-day disposition
requirement is triggered.
The trial court did not overlook subsection (1).
Analyzing that provision, the court discerned three main
elements, necessary to trigger the 120-day requirement:

first,

the defendant must be serving a term of incarceration; next, an
"untried indictment or information" must be pending; third, the
defendant must file a written disposition demand.

The "written

demand" element, in turn, contains three subelements:

the demand

must specify the nature of the pending charge, specify the court
wherein the charge is pending, and request disposition of the
charge (R. 318-21) .5 McGrath's dismissal argument founders for
want of two necessary statutory elements,
5

McGrath's demand (appendix I of this brief) was submitted on
a preprinted form, evidently prepared by prison officials, that
does not list the elements of a proper disposition demand under
section 77-29-1. The trial court and defense counsel alluded to
this problem (R. 321); however, it is not pursued on appeal.
13

1.

No Untried Information.

The trial court correctly determined that the second
main element to trigger the 120-day disposition requirement--an
untried indictment or information--was lacking when McGrath filed
his disposition demand.

Therefore, under State

v. Wright,

P.2d 447, 451 (Utah 1987), and State v. Farnsworth,

745

30 Utah 2d

435, 519 P.2d 244, 246 (1974), both holding that the speedy
disposition statute does not apply to not-yet-filed criminal
charges, McGrath's disposition demand was premature, and did not
trigger the statute's operation.6
McGrath seems to assume that contemplated charges
trigger the 120-day disposition statute.

Not so.

The State was

not required to immediately file its criminal information, given
that McGrath was arrested not just in contemplation of formal
charges connected with the Vert robbery, but also for parole
violation.

Under these circumstances the State was permitted--

indeed, obliged--to not file the criminal information until
satisfied that it could prove McGrath's guilt beyond a reasonable
e

State v. Clark, 28 Utah 2d 272, 501 P.2d 274, 275-76 (1972),
also supporting this rule, was seemingly overruled in State
v.
Moore, 521 P.2d 556, 558 (Utah 1974), holding that the time period
under the former statute, Utah Code Ann. § 77-65-1 (Supp. 1973),
commenced upon filing of the information, rather than upon a
disposition demand made after an information is filed. But Moore,
a 3-2 opinion that did not mention Farnsworth,
involved the State's
attempt to avoid the speedy disposition requirement by dismissing
an information as the disposition deadline approached, then
refiling the same charges anew; this attempt to nullify the
disposition demand filed upon the original information was properly
thwarted by the Moore majority. Further, Wright, 745 P.2d at 451,
approvingly cited Farnsworth,
thereby supporting the rule that the
speedy disposition statute is not triggered until an information is
filed and a disposition demand is then made.
14

doubt.

See State v. Smith,

699 P.2d 711, 713 (Utah 1985) (per

curiam) (decided under constitutional speedy trial principles).
In line with Smith,

Section 77-29-1 should not be construed to

confer a "speedy charging" requirement.
In fact, it appears that section 77-29-1 confers no
more right to speedy filing of charges against McGrath, an
incarcerated person, than it would to a nonincarcerated person.
In either situation, the State has a four-year limitations
period, Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-302 (Supp. 1993), to commence a
felony prosecution by filing an information.

Cf. Farnsworth,

519

P.2d at 246 (predecessor statute did not create "a 90-day statute
of limitations on any crime, discovered or undiscovered, that [a
prisoner] may have committed").

In the meantime, the question

whether McGrath's parole could be formally revoked--in connection
with the Vert robbery or for other reasons--was, as McGrath
conceded in the trial court, a matter to be decided by the Board
of Pardons (R. 309, 314). Cf. Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-11 (1990).
2.. Failure to Specify Charges or Court.
The trial court also noted that McGrath's disposition
demand did not adequately specify the charges that he alleged
were pending against him, and the court in which the charges were
pending.

Because the demand thus did not put prosecutors on

notice of their 120-day disposition obligation, it was
ineffective (R. 321). This ruling was correct under Wright,

745

P.2d at 451 (letter from Canadian authorities holding defendant,
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asking whether Utah authorities wished to prosecute him, did not
trigger speedy disposition statute).
It was also correct as a matter of policy.

In the

trial court, the prosecutor explained that upon receipt of
McGrath's disposition demand, the prosecutor's office would have
checked for any actually-filed criminal charges against him;
finding none, no further action would be taken on the demand (R.
311-13).

McGrath argued that the prosecutor's office should have

entered his disposition demand into its records, so that it would
come into effect once the information was filed (R. 314, 321).
However, no unduly onerous burden is created by
requiring a person in McGrath's position to wait to file a
disposition demand until a criminal information is actually filed
and served upon him, or to refile a previous, premature demand at
that time.

It is relatively wasteful of public time and

resources to record demands for disposition of nonexistent
charges, against the possibility that charges might later be
filed.

And only upon actual filing of charges can the defendant

learn their nature and the court in which they are pending, and
appropriately demand their disposition.
On balance, it is better to require an incarcerated
person to file a section 77-29-1 disposition demand when charges
are actually filed.

This policy is in accord with case law

holding that a premature demand has no effect.

For these

reasons, the trial court correctly rejected McGrath's "speedy
disposition" argument.
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POINT TWO
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE
GUILTY VERDICT FOR THEFT BY RECEIVING
In his second point on appeal, McGrath asserts that the
evidence was insufficient to support the jury's guilty verdict.
His poorly-articulated argument fails.
A.

McGrath Has Not Properly Briefed this Point.
As a threshold matter, McGrath neither acknowledges nor

obeys the settled rule that in an appellate challenge to the
sufficiency of evidence, the appellant must marshal all the
evidence that supports the verdict, and then demonstrate that,
even viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, that
evidence is insufficient.

See State

v. Moore,

802 P.2d 732, 738-

39 (Utah App. 1990) (tracing history of evidence-marshaling
requirement, and holding it applicable in challenges to jury
verdicts in criminal trials).
Instead, McGrath repeats his unsuccessful closing trial
argument, to the effect that he was only an "unknowing spectator"
to Cory Brooks' commission of the Vert robbery, to Brooks'
subsequent attempt to dispose of the loot (R. 711). Without
record citation, McGrath interprets trial testimony in his favor,
rather than in a verdict-favoring light,7

That does not comply

with the "marshaling" rule.
7

Without record citation, McGrath asserts that "[t]he
prosecution, in its opening statement, admitted that it had
absolutely no evidence linking the defendant, Mr. McGrath, with the
[Vert] robbery" (Br. of Appellant at 16) . The prosecutor's opening
statement (R. 420-25) contains no such admission; defense counsel
made that assertion in his opening argument (R. 426).
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This Court and the Utah Supreme Court have repeatedly
refused to consider assignments of error that are not properly
briefed on appeal.

E.g.,

State

v. Bishop,

753 P.2d 439, 450

(Utah 1988) (appellate court is "not simply a dumping ground in
which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and
research" (quotation and citation omitted))/ State

v.

Amicone,

689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984) ("Since the defendant fails to
support this argument by any legal analysis or authority, we
decline to rule on it"); State

v. Yates,

834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah

App. 1992) ("This court has routinely declined to consider
arguments which are not adequately briefed on appeal"); State
Price,

v.

827 P.2d 247, 248-50 (Utah App. 1992); Utah R. App. P.

24(a)(9).

This Court has also rejected "insufficient evidence"

arguments for failure to obey the marshaling rule.
v. Gray,

E.g.,

851 P.2d 1217, 1225 (UtahApp.), cert, denied,

943 (Utah 1993).

State
860 P.2d

McGrath's "insufficient evidence" argument can

likewise be rejected, without reaching the merits.
B.

McGrath's Argument Also Fails on its Merits.
On the merits, the jury was instructed on the elements

of second degree felony theft by receiving, under Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-408(1) (Supp. 1993), § 76-6-412 (1990):

(1) receiving,

retaining or disposing of another's property; (2) knowing or
believing that the property had been stolen; (3) receiving,
retaining, or disposing of the property with intent to deprive
the owner of it; and (4) property valued at over one thousand
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dollars (R. 151) . The jury heard sufficient evidence to find
that these elements were satisfied.
As set forth in this brief's fact recitation, McGrath
purchased a pistol (with Glenda Steadman's help) that looked like
the weapon used by Cory Brooks in the Vert robbery.

After the

robbery, McGrath drove Brooks to at least two locations during
efforts to sell jewelry matching that stolen in the robbery.
After Mrs. Langenbacker reported her suspicions to police,
McGrath threatened her, tending to confirm his knowing
involvement in Brooks' criminal activities.

Finally, Martha Vert

testified that the stolen jewelry was valued well above one
thousand dollars. All this permitted the jury to find that
second degree felony theft by receiving was proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.
verdicts, e.g.,

Given the broad deference accorded to jury

State

v. Walker,

743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987),

McGrath's appellate challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
therefore fails.
POINT THREE
McGRATH HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED "PLAIN ERROR" TO
SUPPORT HIS APPELLATE ASSERTION OF
"PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT"
In his third point on appeal, McGrath asserts that the
guilty verdict was tainted by "extensive and pervasive
prosecutorial misconduct."

The alleged instances of misconduct,

however, were not preserved for appeal by objection at trial.
McGrath acknowledges that "plain error" analysis is therefore
needed to reach this point (Br. of Appellant at 22-23) .
19

"Plain error" consists of three elements:
must be error.

First, there

Second, the error "should have been obvious" to

the trial court when it occurred; that is, it must be "palpable."
Third, the error must have been prejudicial to the defense; that
is, there must exist "a reasonable likelihood that absent the
error, the outcome below would have been more favorable."

It is

McGrath's burden to show that all three elements are satisfied.
See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993).
McGrath has not carried his burden.

His broadly-cast

argument cites case law and rules about prosecutors' ethical
responsibilities.

He then alleges, without citation to the

record, that the prosecutor in this case performed unethically
(Br. of Appellant at 17-25) .8 He makes no real effort to show
that the alleged prosecutor missteps were obvious or "palpable."
Like his "insufficient evidence" argument, addressed in Point Two
of this brief, this Court can reject McGrath's "prosecutor
misconduct" argument for lack of proper appellate analysis.

8

Regarding three claimed prosecutorial missteps in McGrath's
Brief of Appellant at 23, the prosecutor admitted that McGrath was
not on triail for robbery, but that the stolen goods that he was
charged with receiving had been stolen in the Vert robbery (R.
711); this was in rebuttal to defense counsel's "unknowing
spectator" argument. The prosecutor did state that Brooks had been
convicted of the Vert robbery (R. 693); Brooks' Brief of Appellant
to this Court, No. 920853-CA, at 3, confirms that Brooks was found
guilty in March 1992, before the June 1992 closing argument in this
case--making the prosecutor's statement true. The State cannot
locate an Instance wherein the prosecutor "stated . . . that Ms.
Steadman's testimony could be considered by the jury as substantive
evidence."
20

A.

The Prosecutor Advanced No Obviously Improper
"Aiding and Abetting" Case.
Without conceding that it is obliged to do so, the

State will attempt to clarify and respond to the merits of
McGrath's "prosecutor misconduct" argument.

McGrath asserts that

the prosecutor improperly tried him for "aiding and abetting" the
Vert robbery.

He broadly laments that the prosecutor "delved

constantly into irrelevant facts," and "paraded" Cory Brooks'
"egregious activities, and even his gun" before the jury "for the
deliberate purpose of alarming them and tainting [the]
prosecution" (Br. of Appellant at 9, 16, 21).
In essence, McGrath's argument really is that the
prosecutor used inadmissible evidence to convict him.

However,

he does not prove plain error in the admission of the now
complained-of evidence.

McGrath does not demonstrate how this

evidence was irrelevant to the elements of theft by receiving, or
if relevant, that its probative value was "substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice" under Rules 4 01,
4 02, 403, Utah Rules of Evidence.9
To prove theft by receiving, it was necessary for the
State to prove that McGrath had reason to believe that the
jewelry displayed by Brooks, in McGrath's company, was stolen.

9

McGrath sprinkles his "prosecutor misconduct" argument with
terminology such as "due process," the right to an impartial jury,
and the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard, plus citation to
American Bar Association standards and attorney ethical standards.
Believing the evidentiary issues identified in the main text to
more accurately characterize the nub of McGrath's argument, the
State does not further respond his other, undeveloped assertions.
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408(1) (Supp. 1993).

Therefore, there was

no error in permitting Stephanie Vert to describe the Vert
robbery and the events surrounding it (R. 434-37):

that

description was relevant to an element of the crime charged
against McGrath.

Evidence that McGrath, accompanied by Brooks,

helped to purchase the weapon evidently used in the robbery also
helped tie him to the robbery and to the subsequent attempts to
dispose of the stolen goods.
Further, the foregoing evidence was not unfairly
prejudicial to McGrath:

Stephanie Vert's description was

unembellished, simply stating that Brooks "held me at gunpoint"
and left her "[h]andcuffed to the bathroom pipes . . . "

(R. 436,

437) . She did not describe how Brooks ordered her to crawl into
the bathroom, how he had her repeat the process of cuffing
herself to the plumbing, and how he threatened "[you better not
remember what I look like," recounted in this Court's review of
Brooks' conviction.

State

v. Brooks,

868 P.2d 818, 819 (Utah

App. 1993).. Thus redacted of unneeded detail, the robbery
description was not likely to rouse McGrath's trial jury to
"overmastering hostility" against him.
760 P.2d 291, 296 (Utah 1988).

Cf.

State

v.

Shickles,

Similarly, the evidence that

McGrath helped to purchase the apparent robbery weapon was not
inflammatory; it described only factual observations.
Nor does McGrath satisfy the "obviousness" element of
plain error.

The above-cited rules of evidence, dealing with

relevance and the balance between relevance and unfair prejudice,
22

vest substantial discretion in the trial courts.
Bethers,
State

Bambrough

v.

552 P.2d 1286, 1290 (Utah 1976) (Utah R. Evid. 402);
v. Hamilton,

827 P.2d 232, 239-40 (Utah 1992) (Utah R.

Evid. 403). McGrath conceivably could argue that another trial
judge might more strictly limit the description of the Vert
robbery and the gun purchase under these rules.

That, however,

falls short of proving "obvious" error.
There is merit to McGrath's contention that the nowchallenged evidence harmed his defense.

This was a rather close

case; the jury required eight hours to reach its verdict (R.
236).

Without the now-challenged evidence, the State might not

have prevailed at trial.

But no known principle denies the State

an opportunity to prevail in close cases. And because McGrath
has not proven that the now-challenged evidence was inadmissible,
much less obviously inadmissible, the question whether that
evidence harmed him is of no concern:

this Court can conclude

that any harm, like that caused by any properly admitted
evidence, was legitimately visited upon McGrath.
B.

The Prosecutor Made No Obviously Improper Use of
Impeachment Evidence.
McGrath's argument that the prosecutor improperly used

"impeachment testimony as substantive evidence" appears to
complain about the edited tape of Glenda Steadman's March 1991
phone conversation with police, played to the jury at McGrath's
1992 trial. At trial, Steadman denied purchasing the suspected
robbery weapon for McGrath; in the March 1991 conversation,
however, Steadman had admitted that she had done so, even stating
23

that McGrath had helped to select the weapon (R. 185-88, copied
in appendix II of this brief).10

The trial court ruled that the

tape could be used only to impeach Steadman's trial testimony,
and not as substantive evidence (R. 566-67).
Even if the Steadman tape had been admitted as
substantive evidence, this would not satisfy the "error" element
of plain error.

The tape revealed a prior inconsistent statement

that Steadman was allowed to explain or deny at McGrath's trial,
and about which McGrath, through counsel, was able to question
Steadman (R. 516-26, also copied in appendix II).

Under Rule

613(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, the conversation was therefore
admissible, with no "impeachment only" limitation.
The Steadman tape also fell outside the definition of
hearsay, under Rule 801(d)(1), Utah Rules of Evidence; under this
rule, too, the taped conversation was admissible as substantive
State

evidence.

v. Ramsey,

782 P.2d 480, 483-84 (Utah 1989) . In

short, by limiting the use of the Steadman tape for impeachment
only the trial court erred--but to McGrath's advantage.

McGrath

has no cause to complain of such error.
Because the Steadman tape was admissible for its
substance, it necessarily follows that "obviousness" element of
plain error is also unmet on this appellate evidentiary challenge
by McGrath.

Nor can the "prejudice" element of plain error be

satisfied with respect to the Steadman tape. McGrath exaggerates
10

The tape also recounts a post-robbery attempt by Brooks to
dispose of the pistol; at trial, Steadman denied any recollection
of describing such an attempt (R. 183, 518).
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if he asserts that the prosecutor overused the tape in his

closing

argument;

he mentioned

it only briefly,

in rebuttal,

and

in connection with the independent evidence that Steadman had
bought the suspected robbery weapon for McGrath (R. 715-16).n
Thus McGrath has proven no "plain error" ground for appellate
relief on this evidentiary question.
Perhaps McGrath means to argue that the Steadman tape
was not adequately edited of inadmissible content (Br. of
Appellant at 22) . However, the record reveals that the trial
court and counsel for both parties were quite diligent in editing
the tape (R. 567-78); the version played to the jury (transcribed
at R. 183-88, appendix II of this brief) recounts portions of the
conversation to the effect that the pistol was purchased for
McGrath, without being so gutted by the editing of less relevant
material as to be rendered meaningless.
In fact, when it came time to play the edited tape to
the jury, defense counsel expressly acquiesced (R. 584). Given
this, along with the trial court's discretion in questions of
relevance and prejudice, it cannot be said (if McGrath means to
argue) that plain error was committed in the editing and playback
of the taped conversation.

n

No matter how the jury utilized the taped conversation, the
net effect would be to reject Steadman's testimony that she did not
purchase the pistol for McGrath, and to conclude that she had done
so. As Judge Hand put it, "If, from all that the jury see of the
witness, they conclude that what he says now is not the truth, but
what he said before, they are none the less deciding from what they
see and hear of that person and in court." Di Carlo v.
United
States,
6 F.2d 364, 368 (2nd Cir. 1925).
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POINT FOUR
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED McGRATH'S
MISTRIAL MOTION, AGAINST HIS CONTENTION THAT
INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE WAS REVIEWED DURING
-JURY DELIBERATIONS.
McGrath next contends that a mistrial should have been
granted when the trial court learned that the edited transcript
of Glenda Steadman's taped conversation with police, described in
Point Three of this brief (and copied in appendix II), had been
taken into the jury room during deliberations.
however, did not abuse its discretion, State

The trial court,

v. Speer,

750 P.2d

186, 190 (Utah 1988), in denying the mistrial motion.12
A.

Procedural Background.
McGrath accurately recounts that the transcript, issued

to help the. jurors listen to the Steadman tape (R. 584) but not
admitted into evidence, was inadvertently allowed into the jury
room.

This was discovered when the jurors sent out a note,

asking the trial court about how to use the material for
impeachment purposes (the note was penned on the transcript, R.
183, copied in appendix II).

The trial court retrieved the

transcript, consulted with counsel, and responded that the
contents of the taped conversation were to be used only for
impeachment--not as substantive evidence (R. 189, 732-35).

12

Each juror evidently received a copy of the transcript; it
is referred to in the singular only for purposes of clarity in the
main text of this brief. Because McGrath's trial counsel did move
for a mistrial on this point (R. 731), thereby preserving it for
appellate review, there is no need for "plain error" analysis, as
suggested by McGrath (Br. of Appellant at 3, 26) .
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B.

The Mistrial Motion Was Properly Denied.
For three reasons, the trial court properly denied

McGrath's mistrial motion.

First, as explained in Point Three of

this brief, the trial court erroneously ruled that the taped
conversation was inadmissible as substantive evidence:

under the

pertinent evidentiary rules, it was admissible to prove the facts
asserted therein.

Utah R. Evid. 613(b), 801(d)(1).

The

transcript, accurately setting forth the edited tape's content,
was admissible extrinsic evidence of Steadman's prior
inconsistent statement.

Utah R. Evid. 613(b).13

Therefore, it

does not matter if the transcript was inadvertently admitted into
evidence:

it could have been formally admitted.
Second, the trial court remedied the perceived problem,

by retrieving the transcript, and re-instructing the jury that
its contents were to be used for impeachment only.

Once more,

because that limitation on the use of the Steadman tape was not
legally required, McGrath was probably not entitled to that
remedy.

He ought not complain, on appeal, of receiving such

unduly favorable treatment.
Third, even assuming that the transcript should not
have gone to the jury, the trial court concluded that the
transcript was dissimilar from the kinds of "extraneous"

"Adequate foundation was laid for admission of the taped
conversation and the transcript. The officer who recorded the
conversation authenticated the tape (R. 582-83). In editing the
tape and transcript for their presentation to the jury, the trial
court and counsel appear to have been satisfied that the transcript
accurately reflected the tape (R. 567-78, 732).
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materials or "outside influence," Utah R. Evid. 606(b), normally
considered impermissible for jury deliberations:
[T]here is a distinction in the court's mind
between this and the kind of other extraneous
materials that you refer to, Mr. Athay, such as a
dictionary. A dictionary is filled with all kinds
of information that juries [] can read and apply or
misapply.
This transcript of the telephonic
conversation was edited prior to the time that the
tape was played to the jury. It contains only
what the jury heard anyway; and the question in
the court's mind clearly indicates that the jury
knew that this was being used to impeach the
testimony of the witness.
(R. 732). On appeal, McGrath does not attack this reasoning,
which permits this Court to affirm the denial of McGrath's
mistrial motion.
POINT FIVE
McGRATH HAS NOT PROVEN THAT HE WAS
INEFFECTIVELY ASSISTED BY TRIAL COUNSEL
McGrath next argues that he was ineffectively assisted
by trial counsel.

This Sixth Amendment-based claim is governed

by a familiar, two-element standard.

The complaining defendant

must prove, first, that counsel's performance was objectively
deficient.

Second, the defendant must prove that prejudice

resulted from counsel's deficiency; i.e., that but for the
alleged counsel blunder(s), there is a reasonable probability
that the trial outcome would have been different.
Washington,

Strickland

466 U.S. 668, 690, 696 (1984); State v. Verde,

P.2d 116, 118-19 SL n.2 (Utah 1989).

770

The defendant has a heavy

burden of persuasion on both elements.
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v.

Parsons

v. Barnes,

23 0

Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 5-6 (Utah 1994).

In this case, McGrath has not

carried his burden.
A.

McGrath's Allegation that Counsel Improperly
Prevented Him from Testifying in His Own Defense
is Unsupported bv Record Evidence.
McGrath's primary counsel ineffectiveness argument

rests upon his allegation that during trial, counsel refused to
let McGrath testify in his own defense (Br. of Appellant at 8-9,
27-33).

As a factual matter, that allegation is unsupported by

the trial court record.

Instead, McGrath raises it in an ex

parte affidavit, copied in an addendum to his brief on appeal.
McGrath's affidavit cannot stand as proof of any
factual matter pertinent to his counsel ineffectiveness argument.
Its credibility is untested, and trial counsel has been afforded
no opportunity to respond to it.

The affidavit is, in short, "a

unilateral allegation which the review court has no power to
determine."

State

v. Wulffenstein,

1982), cert, denied,

657 P.2d 289, 293 (Utah

460 U.S. 1044 (1983).

Accord

714 P.2d 296, 297 (Utah 1986); State v. Bingham,

State

v.

Cook,

684 P.2d 43, 46

(Utah 1984) ("This Court cannot rule on matters outside the trial
court record").

Accordingly, this Court should strike McGrath's

affidavit, and summarily reject all aspects of his counsel
ineffectiveness argument that depend upon it.14

"McGrath has filed no motion for an evidentiary hearing under
Rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, to find whether trial
counsel in fact barred him from testifying.
Because the rule
specifies that such a motion must "be filed prior to the filing of
the appellant's brief," McGrath has waived the right to do so.
29

Consistent with such disposition, the State does not
address any possible merit to this aspect of McGrath's counsel
ineffectiveness claim under Strickland.

McGrath's argument is

essentially based upon hypothetical facts; as such, the State
perceives no worthwhile purpose in addressing it.
B.

McGrath's Argument that Trial Counsel Improperly
Failed to Object to Certain Evidence is Not
Properly Briefed on Appeal.
McGrath also asserts that trial counsel blundered by

not objecting to evidence about Cory Brooks' commission of the
Vert robbery.

This assertion, however, is formulated in

conclusory terms, without articulate analysis.

E.g.,

Br. of

Appellant at 10 (fact recitation alleging that "totally
irrelevant" and "highly prejudicial" evidence was received);

id.

at 33-34 (argument that counsel should have objected to evidence
on grounds of irrelevance and undue prejudice).

Like his

"insufficient evidence" and "prosecutor misconduct" assertions,
described in Points Two and Three of this brief, this aspect of
McGrath's counsel ineffectiveness claim can be rejected for
failure to properly analyze it on appeal.
On the merits, trial counsel performed competently in
dealing with the State's evidence.

As set forth in Point Three

of this brief, responding to McGrath's "prosecutor misconduct"
argument, evidence of Brooks' commission of the Vert robbery was
relevant to prove theft by receiving, and as presented in this
case, not unduly prejudicial to McGrath.

Trial counsel,

exercising his professional judgment, was clearly permitted to
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recognize this, and to limit his evidentiary objections
accordingly.

And given the defense theory that McGrath was

merely an "unknowing spectator" to Brooks' criminal acts (R.
711), such objections would seldom be necessary.
Further, as McGrath admits, evidentiary objections can
themselves prejudice the defense (Br. of Appellant at 25); he
therefore cannot assail trial counsel for failing to raise every
conceivable objection.

McGrath has not proven that trial

counsel's approach to evidence of Brooks' crimes was outside "the
wide range of professionally reasonable assistance,"
466 U.S. at 689.

Strickland,

Therefore, McGrath has not proven that counsel

performed deficiently in this regard.
McGrath concedes away the "resulting prejudice" element
of counsel ineffectiveness.

He simply alleges that had trial

counsel approached the evidentiary questions differently, "the
outcome at trial may well have been a verdict of not guilty" (Br.
of Appellant at 34-35).

That is only an assertion that counsel's

alleged miscues "had some conceivable effect on the outcome of
the proceeding," Strickland,

466 U.S. at 693; it falls short of

the required "reasonable probability" of a more favorable result,
id.

at 694. All in all, McGrath's counsel ineffectiveness

argument does not warrant appellate relief.
POINT SIX
EVIDENCE OF McGRATH'S THREAT AGAINST A
STATE'S WITNESS WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED
In his sixth, rather cursory point on appeal, McGrath
argues that evidence of his threat against Mrs. Langenbacker was
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inadmissible.

Mrs. Langenbacker testified that a couple of days

after she called police to report her suspicion of McGrath's and
Brooks' involvement in the Vert robbery, McGrath telephoned her,
telling Mrs. Langenbacker to keep her mouth shut, or else "he
would make sure it was permanently shut." (R. 470) .15 Under the
substantial discretion vested in trial courts to determine the
relevance and the prejudicial risks of evidence, e.g., Bambrough
v. Bethers,
and State

552 P.2d 1286, 1290 (Utah 1976) (Utah R. Evid. 402),
v. Hamilton,

827 P.2d 232, 239-40 (Utah 1992) (Utah R.

Evid. 403), McGrath's threat was legitimately admitted.
To prove theft by receiving, the State had to prove
that McGrath knowingly participated, with Brooks, in possessing
or disposing of the jewelry stolen in the Vert robbery.

McGrath

mounted an "unknowing spectator" defense, denying the essential
"knowing" mens rea element of the offense.

By threatening Mrs.

Langenbacker, McGrath demonstrated awareness that the jewelry was
stolen; therefore, the threat was relevant to a disputed element
of the crime, and admissible under Rules 401 and 402 Utah Rules
of Evidence.

And as an "other act" tending to show "absence of

mistake or accident" in McGrath's association with Brooks'
activities, the threat was also admissible under Rule 404(b),
Utah Rules of Evidence.

See State

v. O'Neil,

848 P.2d 694, 698 &

n.4 (Utah App.) (defendant asserted that he was an innocent

15

The trial court sustained a hearsay-based objection to Curtis
Langenbacker's attempt to testify that after he took the marquise
diamond ring, Brooks threatened that he and McGrath would hurt
Curtis if he tried to "rip him off" (R. 474).
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bystander to his wife's drug dealing; his effort to collect debts
from her sale of drugs on credit was supported by Rule 4 04 case
law), cert, denied,

859 P.2d 586 (Utah 1993).

Nor was the threat so inflammatory in its content as to
render it unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403, Utah Rules of
Evidence.

In this regard, State

v. Maurer,

770 P.2d 981 (Utah

1989), relied upon by McGrath, is readily distinguishable.
Maurer,

In

a letter written by the murder defendant to the victim's

father was deemed inadmissible under Rule 403, because even
though it admitted the defendant's guilt, it also contained
language that was highly likely to inflame the jury.

770 P.2d at

982 (calling victim "a fucking whore," "a stupid bitch," and
saying that it "was a great feeling to watch her die").

The one-

sentence threat by McGrath in this case pales in comparison to
the disapproved evidence in Maurer.

Therefore, the trial court

did not abuse its discretion in permitting that threat to be
revealed at McGrath's trial.
POINT SEVEN
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO PREJUDICIAL
ERROR IN ITS INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY DEFINING
THEFT BY RECEIVING
As his final point on appeal, McGrath argues that the
trial court committed "plain error" by instructing the jury, in
instruction number one, that possession of a dangerous weapon was
an element of the charged crime, theft by receiving.

During its

deliberations, the jury asked the trial court about the variance
between that instruction and instruction thirteen, which
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accurately--that is, without mention of a weapon--set forth the
elements of theft by receiving.

Responding, the court informed

the jury that the "dangerous weapon" language in instruction one
was to be disregarded, and that it was to reach its verdict on
instruction- thirteen only (R. 182, copied, with instructions one
and thirteen, in appendix III of this brief).
That response properly remedied the instructional
error.

And because that remedy was provided upon consultation

with counsel (R. 182, 735), who did not thereafter object,
McGrath's assertion of "obvious error" fails:

the involved

parties expressly agreed that the trial court's remedy--which
corrected an erroneous statement of the law--was proper.
Nor is the "prejudice" element of plain error
satisfied.

Ironically, the corrected error was of a type that,

if uncorrected, could have actually aided McGrath:

unable to

find that McGrath was armed at any time relevant to the
commission of theft by receiving, the jury would have acquitted
him, had it believed that possession of a weapon was an element
of that offense.

Therefore, McGrath cannot claim reversible

error in this point on appeal.
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CONCLUSION
McGrath was fairly tried and justly found guilty of
theft by receiving stolen property.

Accordingly, his conviction

should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this \\Q

day of June, 1994.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

J. ¥KEVIN MURPHY
Assistant Attorney General
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APPENDIX I
"Speedy Disposition" Statute
March 1991 Disposition Demand
Parole Revocation Documents

77-28a-5

UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

77-28a-5. Governor — Power to enter into contracts.
The governor is empowered to enter into such contracts on behalf of this
state as may be appropriate to implement its participation in the Interstate
Corrections Compact pursuant to Article m thereof.
History: C. 1953, 77-28*5, enacted by L.
1982, ch. 38, § 1; 1983, ch. 320, § 92.

CHAPTER 29
DISPOSITION OF DETAINERS AGAINST
PRISONERS
Section
77-29-1.

77-29-2.
77-29-3.
77-29-4
77-29-5

Prisoner's demand for disposition
of pending charge — Duties of
custodial officer — Continuance
may be granted — Dismissal of
charge for failure to bring to
trial
Duty of custodial officer to inform
prisoner of untried indictments
or informations.
Chapter inapplicable to incompetent persons
Escape of prisoner voids demand.
Interstate agreement on detainers
— Enactment into law — Text
of agreement.

Section
77-29-6.
77-29-7.
77-29-8.
77-29-9.
77-29-10.
77-29-11.

Interstate agreement — "Appropriate court" defined.
Interstate agreement — Duty of
state agencies and political subdivisions to co-operate.
Interstate agreement — Application of habitual criminal law
Interstate agreement — Escape of
prisoner while in temporary
custody.
Interstate agreement — Duty of
warden.
Interstate agreement — Attorney
general as administrator and
information agent.

77-29-1. Prisoner's demand for disposition of pending
charge — Duties of custodial officer — Continuance may be granted — Dismissal of charge for
failure to bring to trial.
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in the state
prison, jail or other penal or correctional institution of this state, and there is
pending against the prisoner in this state any untried indictment or information, and the prisoner shall deliver to the warden, sheriff or custodial officer in
authority, or any appropriate agent of the same, a written demand specifying
the nature of the charge and the court wherein it is pending and requesting
disposition of the pending charge, he shall be entitled to have the charge
brought to trial within 120 days of the date of delivery of written notice.
(2) Any warden, sheriff or custodial officer, upon receipt of the demand
described in Subsection (1), shall immediately cause the demand to be forwarded by personal delivery or certified mail, return receipt requested, to the
appropriate prosecuting attorney and court clerk. The warden, sheriff or custodial officer shall, upon request of the prosecuting attorney so notified, provide the attorney with such information concerning the term of commitment
of the demanding* prisoner as shall be requested.
(3) After written demand is delivered as required in Subsection (1), the
prosecuting attorney or the defendant or his counsel, for good cause shown in
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DISPOSITION OF DETAINERS AGAINST PRISONERS

77-29-1

open court, with the prisoner or his counsel being present, may be granted any
reasonable continuance.
(4) In the event the charge is not brought to trial within 120 days, or within
such continuance as has been granted, and defendant or his counsel moves to
dismiss the action, the court shall review the proceeding. If the court finds
that the failure of the prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard within
the time required is not supported by good cause, whether a previous motion
for continuance was made or not, the court shall order the matter dismissed
with prejudice.
History: C. 1953, 77-29-1, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 16, t 2.

Cross-References. — Right to speedy trial,
Utah Const., Art. I, § 12; § 77-1-6.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Delay ceased by prisoner.
Where statute provided that prisoner be
brought to trial within ninety days of his request for disposition of pending charges, the
ninety-day disposition period was to be extended by the amount of time during which
defendant himself created delay. State v.
Velasquez, 641 P.2d 115 (Utah 1982).

ANALYSIS

Commencement of period.
Delay caused by codefendant's action.
Delay caused by prisoner.
Forfeiture.
Good cause for continuance.
Good cause for failure.
Premature request.
Prosecutor's delay.
Warden's delay.
Written demand.
Commencement of period.
Ninety-day period for prosecution under former f 77-65-1 commenced on the day defendant notified county attorney of his request for
final disposition of case or cases pending
against him; and the filing of a complaint, information or indictment did not affect the commencement of the period. State v. Moore, 521
P.2d 556 (Utah 1974).
Motion to dismiss charges against defendant
who was brought to trial 92 days after warden
received notice of his request for final disposition of pending charges was properly denied
since computation of then 90-day time period
commenced from date that notice was delivered to county attorney and appropriate court.
State v. Taylor, 538 P.2d 310 (Utah 1975).
Delay caused by codefendant's action.
Defendant was not entitled to a dismissal of
the charges where the trial was delayed beyond the 120-day time period, and the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in finding
that there was good cause for the delay, where
the delay was reasonable and not the result of
the prosecution's actions or inactions, but was
due to a codefendant, who was to be jointly
tried with defendant and who was expected to
plead guilty at trial as the result of plea negotiations, changing his plea to not guilty on the
scheduled trial date. State v. Trujillo, 656 P.2d
403 (Utah 1982).

Forefeiture.
Defendant did not forfeit his right to have
charges against him dismissed by remaining
silent and failing to request an earlier setting
when trial court set date for trial beyond
ninety-day period required under former
§ 77-65-1; burden of complying with statute
rested on prosecutor. State v. Wilson, 22 Utah
2d 361, 453 P.2d 158 (1969).
Good cause for continuance.
Where defendant's trial date was originally
set for time within ninety-day period provided
for under former § 77-65-1 but, to accommodate defendant's counsel, was postponed until
five days beyond the statutory period, the order
fixing the trial date was within the authority
of the court since good cause for a continuance
had been shown. State v. Bonny, 25 Utah 2d
117, 477 P.2d 147 (1970).
Trial court was within its discretion in
granting continuance for trial on date 91 days
after defendant had submitted written request
for disposition of pending criminal case where
subpoenas had not been issued soon enough to
proceed with trial on original date, despite defendant's counsel suggesting trial date within
ninety-day period. Danks v. Turner, 28 Utah
2d 277, 501 P.2d 631 (1972).
Good cause for failure.
Defendant, who was charged at a time he
had other cases pending against him and in
one of those cases requested and received psychiatric examination and who was appointed
various counsel because of necessity and at his
own request, was not denied right to speedy
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NOTICE AND REQUEST FOR DISPOSITION OF
PENDING CHARGE (S).

TO: GERALD L- COOK, DIRECTOR, UTAH STATE PRISON.
Notice is hereby given that I,

/7?/4r£ FJuUfiCcX

M^B&n

do hereby request final disposition of any charge (s) now pending
against me in any court in the State of Utah. Charges are now
pending against me in the court (s) of
County and request is hereby made that you forward this notice
to the appropriate authorities in that county (s), together with
such other information as required by law.
Pending Charge

Dated this

West Valley City

Theft in

<2%

day of

jfj&&tAf*y

'W^fc
~KJ*J. . vef'J*

V-

, 199/

USP #

.

/T/oC

I hereby certify thiat I received a copu of the foregoing Notice
this

</**-

day of

^-T^ia-ocJi^

, 199 /

Authorized Agent
Utah State Prison
Draper, Utah 84020

EXHIBIT

UTAH STATE PRISON
BOX 250
DRAPER, UTAH
04020
CIRTIFICATE

FOR

DISPOSITION

TO: salt Lake County Attorney
231 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

OF DETAINERS

RE:

Mark McGrath
USP #18106

TERM. OF COMMITMENT

0-5. 1-15 CC 0-5 CS

TIME SERVED

4 Yrs 11 j Months

TIME REMAINING

16 Yrs.

PAROLE ELIGIBIILTY

Returned 2/25/91 on ParnlP v ^ ^ M n n ,
Not been before Board of Pardons yet.
BOARD OF PARDONS DECISION

GERALD L COOK, DIRECTOR

JUNE HINDKLEY
/
RECORDS & ID OFFICER
cc:

County Clerk
File
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BEFORE THE BOARD 0* PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
UT/U STATE OBSCIS :TO. 99994323
Consideration of the Statt )* of MCCRATH, MARK 'EDWARD

PR ISON NO. 18106

Tiie above-entitled aattei: c a ^ before the Utah State bo.-r.
Parole Revocation Hearing on 15th day of May, 1991.
Tae parolee entered the follow!.:- pleas to the allei^atl ^n< contain*--.
Information of Parole Violation:
it Allegation

A.;end

a

"

- the

G u i l t y NotGuilty Dismiss

NC

"SP^S ""ijalTAi^srsriT 27WIT91
VA-3A
FA-3A

2 COMMITTED: THEFT (RECEIVING)
3 COMIITTF.i): 7:<A?0>«T3 VICl,vrr'H

Alter entry

o f tt M
^ aabove>]
b o v e - p l e / f r ^ t h e r . s t a t e m e n t s o f MCGkATH, J1AR:< EDWARD,
^ i i ^ V T ^
> a t t ^ r n e v i or tr:e p a r o l e e , li ie
jar^iee,
iioard made a f i n d i n g t h a t t h e p a r o l e e h . u n o t c o m p i l e d w i t h the. c o n d i t i o n s

23£kL<L<L

orders:

v/

RevoKcParo

\ \ '

j _

p a r o l e o.cice.j

I
-:u o e : ^ect.iv -

t h : ol i.:^**^- s p e c i a l

conditions:

^e-'i^-ri.'Vj. ;ov
" . o c u ' i e -if * < c t i v e
Ec.r/.;c

^ E J Li i ai u

^
?/
"1
2
Z
4

ervtence ef f e o . t i w

_

_

^..

a.ut• J'-. 1 r e l e a s e

•r-v«':r

< A

"xPIRATIO^

"^^171^91

^M-H;
RUSSO:J
RU:iS0::
FREDERICK

15 9e.
- o
v ^ j - 3 57:

ill;

• *" \ll

,_

. i

OXSXte
BURGLARY
~"~ "
BURGLARY
DESTRUCTION Or PROPERTY.
COMMUNICATION FRAJ II )

any t i m e

_ _ !

;

?VL1O'I

oy t : i e

Soar..! o f

03/01/20^2
J2/01/1992
02/2S/2007
Pardons

* r >;, c. iL LO'.y

b;;r o r d e r of t h e B j . j r f f V i r i o n - of i . _ - t ' L
1 5 t h day of Hay, 1"?J , a f f i x e d ~,? c i ^ n a t i . : * <^ C -a*
o n b e: i a 1 • " f f
V r
^ * TT t ~ l
< i.
'
-". - .

: -I. I •. H A UN,

^r,

C n a i i^nia n

f

)

at
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, CB3CIS Wo. 99994323
came before the Utah State Board of Pardons for a Parole Revocation Hearing on
tie 14th day of August, 1931.
1
2
3
4

COURT CASE #
5 c"R 8 5 - 1 3 7 1
5 CXS6 1579
15 931
r
; 9P.7

CRIME OF COMMITMENT
BURGLARY
CO:flUNICVTiO:-J FRAUD
BURGLARY
TJErl (RECElvi:^)

JUDGE
ROTIUfl
FRi-;OE-llCK
RUSSON
RUfiSOJJ

EXPIRATION
12/oi/iyyr
11/30/1996
11/29/2.011
11/29/7.001

The parolee entered rhe following pleas to the allegation? contained in the
Parole Violation Information:
Ji
Allegation
^ ' i ^ i i ^ a i - t y " o t G u i l t y THs-aiss
ivp'-T"~~T ^\lA-^UilU:
02TlTTi7'~
'_
_ J_ "'
PA-3A
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__
"
\
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_
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_

wit;* fcllowiu;/ special conditio::.?:
-';•.

1 .

2.

Terminate sentence (including parole r.opervision on)

_

j.:cpiration of senj^nce to I- <*ffert* v,:%
Schedule rehearing for

Otuer:

fflnJUll/f

.aa&u}^^

_

pertfJj/Jti

MlUrJifQ

1

^4X1

iff

_

Ttv reasons for t:i..s decision are -Hent iMsd or., the attached page.
At tae discretion of the Board of Pardons, this decision is subject to review
a.i.i Tiocificati••*:":• at any tin:*: prior to actual release from enstoiy.
iJ-i- order of the Board of Pardons of the State of Utah, I affix my signature!* DEFENDANT'S

APPENDIX II
Rules 613, 801, Utah Rules of Evidence
Transcript of Steadman Conversation with Police
Transcript of Inconsistent Trial Testimony

Rule 613

UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE
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thereto. Any portion withheld over objections shall be preserved and made
available to the appellate court in the event of an appeal. If a writing is not
produced or delivered pursuant to order under this rule, the court shall make
any order justice requires, except that in criminal cases when the prosecution
elects not to comply, the order shall be one striking the testimony or, if the
court in its discretion determines that the interests of justice so require, declaring a mistrial.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule
generally comports with current Utah practice,
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-

ment, effective October 1, 1992, revised this
rule to make the language gender-neutral.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Admissibility of memorandum.
Necessity of present memory.

Necessity of present memory.
. * * " •£«••«»»«» witness lacked independent
knowledge or memory of the value of a
ring allegedly stolen from him by defendant
Admissibility of memorandum.
n o r w a g y, m e m o r y refreshed after looking at
When a witness can and does testify to the a , i c e rt h e ^ n o
t
al
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1991), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah
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Rule 613. Prior statements of witnesses.
(a) Examining witness concerning prior statement In examining a
witness concerning a prior statement made by the witness, whether written or
not, the statement need not be shown nor its contents disclosed to the witness
at that time, but on request the same shall be shown or disclosed to opposing
counsel.
(b) Extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statement of witness. Extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness is not admissible unless the witness is afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the same
and the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to interrogate the witness
thereon, or the interests of justice otherwise require. This provision does not
apply to admissions of a party-opponent as defined in Rule 801(d)(2).
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is
the federal rule, verbatim. Subsection (a) abandons the position in Queens Case, 129 English
Reports 976 (1S20), requiring that the cross-examiner, prior to examining a witness about his
written statement, must first show the statement to the witness and i» comparable to the
substance of Rule 22(a), Utah Rules of Evi-

dence (1971). The substance of Subsection (b)
was formerly in Rule 22(b), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971).
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amendment, effective October 1, 1992, revised this
rule to make the language gender-neutral,
Cross-References. — Deposition of witness,
use to impeach witness, Rule 32(a), U.R.C.P.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Consistency of statements.
Subdivision (b) has no application when the
prior statement is not inconsistent with trial

testimony. State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769
(Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327
(Utah 1991).

Rule 614. Calling and interrogation of witnesses by court
(a) Calling by court The court may, on its own motion or at the suggestion of a party, call witnesses, and all parties are entitled to cross-examine
witnesses thus called.
(b) Interrogation by court The court may interrogate witnesses, whether
called by itself or by a party.
(c) Objections. Objections to the calling of witnesses by the court or to
interrogation by it may be made at the time or at the next available opportunity when the jury is not present.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
Testimony at trial.
Subdivision (a) provides that a court-appointed expert may be called as a trial witness,

but this is not mandatory. Merriam v.
Merriam, 799 P.2d 1172 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Right of independent expert to refuse to testify as to expert opinion, 50
A.L.R.4th 680.
Right of indigent defendant in state criminal
case to assistance of expert in social attitudes,
74 A.L.R.4th 330.

Right of indigent defendant in state criminal
case to assistance of chemist, toxicologist, technician, narcotics expert, or similar nonmedical
gpecialist in substance analysis, 74 A.L.R.4th
SSS

ARTICLE VIII.
HEARSAY.
Rule 801. Definitions.
The following definitions apply under this article:
(a) Statement A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2)
nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion.
(b) Declarant. A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement.
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted.
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if:
(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the
trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the
statement and the statement is (A) inconsistent with the declarant's
testimony or the witness denies having made the statement or has
forgotten, or (B) consistent with the declarant's testimony and is
offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of
recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, or (C) one of identification of a person made after perceiving the person; or
(2) Admission by party-opponent The statement is offered
against a party and is (A) the party's own statement, in either an
individual or a representative capacity, or (B) a statement of which
the party has manifested an adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a
statement by a person authorized by the party to make a statement
concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by the party's agent or
servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship, or (E) a
statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in
furtherance of the conspiracy.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)
Advisory Committee Note. — Subsection
(a) is in accord with Rule 62(1), Utah Rules of
Evidence (1971).
Subsection (b) is in accord with Rule 62(2),
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). The hearsay
rule is not applicable in declarations of devices
and machines, e.g., radar. The definition of
"hearsay" in subdivision (c) is substantially
the same as Rule 63, Utah Rules of Evidence
(1971).
Subdivision (d)(1) is similar to Rule 63(1),
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). It deviates from
the federal rule in that it allows use of prior
statements as substantive evidence if (l)inconsistent or (2) the witness has forgotten, and
does not require the prior statement to have

been given under oath or subject to perjury.
The former Utah rules admitted such statements as an exception to the hearsay rule. See
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970), with
respect to confrontation problems under the
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Subdivision (d)(1) is as originally promulgated by the United States Supreme Court
with the addition of the language "or the witness denies having made the statement or has
forgotten" and is in keeping with the prior
Utah rule and the actual effect on most juries,
Subdivision (dXlHB) is in substance the
same as Rule 63(1), Utah Rules of Evidence
(1971). The Utah court has been liberal in its
interpretation of the applicable rule in this
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RL:

AND WHERE ARE YOU SUPPOSED
SALTL^9&UN

GS:

^

AND ALL HE TOLD ME, ALL HE GAVE HE WAS ANeyADJOEESS
WAS SUPPOSED TO HAVE A HUNDRED DOLLARS BY 4:00 DOWN THERE

RL:

WHEN WAS THIS? TODAY?

GS:

TODAY.

RL:
GS:

YOU WEREN'T ABLE TO GET THERE?
I DIDN'T, NO, I WASN'T EVEN ABOUT TO TRY TO GET, TO COME UP
WITH A HUNDRED DOLLARS TO GO PAY FOR

RL:

OH, SO HE WASN'T GOING TO GIVE YOU THE MONEY, HE JUST WANTED
YOU TO COME UP WITH IT?

GS:

YAH, HE WANTED KE TO COME UP WITH THE MONEY TO GO PAY FOR THIS
GUN SO THAT IT COULD BE DESTROYED. THAT EVERYTHING WAS ALL
ARRANGED AND EVERYTHING. THAT'S ALL KE WANTED MS TO DO.

RL:

OKAY, SO DO YOU KNOW THIS/ GUY NAKED JAY, AT ALL?

GS:

NO, I DON'T, BUT I HAVE AN ADDRESS.

RL:

OKAY, WHAT'S THE ADDRESS.

GS:

UK, EDDIE WHERE'S THAT ONE ENVELOPE THAT HAS THE EMPLOYEES
VISITING HOURS ON IT? I WROTE EVERYTHING DOWN ON THAT. THIS
IS ALL HE GAVE ME IS "TODAY A HUNDRED DOLLARS, FRIDAY BY 4:00
PM, THE ADDRESS IS 6611 I

RL:

AND THAT'S IN SALT LAKE?

GS:

COTTONWOOD STREET.

RL:

COTTONWOOD STREET?

GS:

AH-HUH.

RL:

OKAY.

GS:

THAT'S ALL HE GAVE ME. KE DIDN'T GIVE MS HIS PHONE NUMBER,
NOTHING AND THEN KE GAVE ME

BUT I COULDN'T.
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RL:

YOU'VE NEVER DEALT WITH THIS GUY BEFORE?

GS:

NO, I DON'T KNOW WHO HE IS.

RL:

HOW DID THEY GET THE GUN?

GS:

I DON'T KNOW.

GS:

BUT I'M TELLING YOU THE COMPLETE TRUTH.

RL:

OKAY, WHEN DID YOU FIND OUT, OR WHEN DID COREY TELL YOU THAT
HE WANTED THIS...INAUDIBLE...

GS:

ON THE PHONE CALL THAT I:E CALLED, HE CALLED ME WEDNESDAY NIGHT
AND WANTED ME TO TRYING AND GATHER U? MONEY FOR TODAY BY FOUR
O'CLOCK FOR IT.

GS:

DO YOU KNOW, I KEPT TELLING THEM, CAUSE YOU KNOW, WHEN I ASKED
COREY WHERE THE GUN WAS

RL:

AH-HUH?

GS:

TKEY HAD ALREADY TOLD ME THAT HE HAD TOLD ME THAT IT WAS TAKEN
CARS OF. I SAYS, I SAYS, I DON'T KNOW WHERE IT'S AT AND I
DON'T LIKE THE IDEA OF THIS. I SAYS I'M GOING TO CALL THE GUN
IN AS MISSING OR WHATEVER. HE SAYS NO, THE GUNS BEEN TAKEN
CARE OF, DON'T WORRY A30UT IT.

RL:

UM, WHICH PAWN SHOP WAS IT, YOU PURCHASED IT FROM?

GS:

IT WAS DOWN ON STATE STREET IN MIDVALE.

RL:

STATE STREET IN MIDVALE, HUH?
IT?

GS:

I DON'T KNOW THE NAME OF IT. I COULDN'T, YOU KNOW, I KNOW
EXACTLY WHERE IT'S AT, BUT I DON'T KNOW THE NAME OF IT.

RL:

WAS IT HY AND MIKES?

GS:

YES, IT WAS.

RL:

IT WAS, HUH?

GS:

IT WAS HY AND MIKES. THAT'S THE ONE THAT'S ON STATE AND NOT
SOTH, BUT A LITTLE FARTHER DOWN TOWARDS FASHION PLACE MALL.

YOU DON'T KNOW?

YOU DON'T REMEMBER THE NAME OF
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RL:

TOWARDS FASHION PLACE MALL.

OKAY, THAT'S WHERE I THOUGHT...

GS:

YAH.

RL:

UM...

GS:

YAH, BY THE NEW SHOPKO.

RL:

I THINK SO, SO IT'S NEAR THE NEW...

GS:

OR PRICE SAVER OR WHATEVER?

RL:

YAH.

GS:

RIGHT THERE. THEY USUALLY HAVE LIKE A LAWN MOWER OR SOMETHING
OUT FRONT.

RL:

OKAY.

GS:

AND THEN THERE'S A COUPLE, I THINK A CAR SHOP NEXT DOOR ACROSS

IS THAT WHAT IT IS?

THE STREET.
RL:

NOW DID COREY AND MARK GO IN WITH YOU?

GS:

YES, THEY DID.

RL:

THEY ACTUALLY, DID THEY ACTUALLY PICK OUT THE GUN YOU WANTED?

GS:

THEY PICKED THE GUN OUT.

RL:
GS:

CAN YOU REMEMBER WHAT IT LOOKED LIKE?
IT WAS, IN FACT I KNOW EXACTLY WHAT IT WAS, IT'S A 194 2 COLT,
3 2 COLT.

RL:

32?

GS:

AUTOMATIC.

RL:

3 2 COLT AUTOMATIC?

GS:

AH-HUH. I HAVE NO PAPERWORK ON IT, WHATEVER V7AS GIVEN TO US
IN THE STORE WAS IN THE SACK AND THEY HAD EVERYTHING. I
CARRIED THE SACK OUTSIDE AND THEN FROM THERE TO MARK'S HOUSE
7". .INAUDIBLE. .
'"""
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RL:

LISTEN, I'M SORRY, YOU KNOW, THAT, I HAVE A HARD TIKE
UNDERSTANDING WHY YOU WOULD DO THAT AND NOT BE SOMEWHAT
SUSPICIOUS AND I WONDER, IS NOT A JURY GOING TO DO THE SAME
THING?

GS:

BECAUSE I DON'T LIKE GUNS AND I DIDN'T, I WOULDN'T EVEN HOLD
IT IN THE STORE.

RL:

NO, NO, NO, NO, THAT'S NOT WHAT I'M REFERRING TO, IS WHY DID
YOU BUY THIS GUN FOR THEM. YOU KNOW, WHY, YOU KNOW, WHY IS IT
YOU DIDN'T ASK MORE QUESTIONS

GS:

WELL COREY SAID

RL:

BECAUSE WHAT A JURY OR SOMEONE

GS:

EVERY TIME I ASKED QUESTIONS THEY JUST TOLD ME IT WAS BETTER
OFF IF I DIDN'T KNOW ANYTHING.

RL:

I THINK THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN ENOUGH TO :iAKE ME SAY, HEY NO I
DON'T THINK I'LL GET INVOLVED, BUT

GS:

I TRIED NOT BUYING THE GUN, BUT THEY, THEY SAID JUST C'KON AND
LOOK, .AjjPXLS HARftSSIECLXQiL IT WOULD BE BETTER OFF IF YOU HAD
THE GUN IN THE HOUSE, IN YOUR ROOM WHERE IF SOMETHING HAPPENED
WHEN I WASN'T AND COREY WASN'T HOME, THEN I WOULD HAVE, YOU
KNOW, HAVE SOME WAY OF PROTECTING MYSELF.

RL:

BUT YET, THEN THEY DIDN'T EVEN GIVE VOU THE GUN WHEN YOU
WALKED OUT.

GS:

NO, WE FUT IT IN MARK'S TRUCK IN THE BACK. AND WHEN I GOT
HOME WE, THEY DROPPED ME OFF AT THE HOUSE CAUSE I HAD TO GO,
I HAD OTHER APPOINTMENTS THAT DAY.

TAPED TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
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GS:

THAT DAY THAT WE BOUGHT IT.

RL:

OKAY, DO YOU REMEMBER WHAT DAY IT WAS?

GS: UM, I DON'T.

I REALLY DON'T.

I'M SORRY.

Ob:

u:-l, I THINK HE PAID $300.00. HE PAID THE CASH RIGHT THERE, I
DIDN'T EVEN TOUCH IT.

RL:

SO DID HE TAKE THE MONEY OUT?

GS:

I DIDN'T EVEN TOUCH ANY OF THE MONEY.

RL:

SO MARK ACTUALLY CAME UP WITH THE MONEY?

GS:

MARK CAME UP WITH THE MONEY AND HANDED IT TO 'EM.

RL:

DO YOU REMEMBER WHAT THE GUY LOOKED LIKE THAT YOU SOLD IT...

GS:

HE WAS AN OLDER GUY.

RL:

OLDER GUY?

GS:

AH-HUH, AN OLDER GUY.

TAPED TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
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RL:

AND HE TOOK THE MONEY FROM MARK, BUT HE USED YOUR DRIVERS
LICENSE?

GS:

AH-KUH.

while she is on the stand.
THE COURT:

Go ahead.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. BLAYLOCK:
Q

Glenda, did you ever have any conversation with

the police about what happened, the purchase of the gun
and so on?
A

I don't recall it really, any conversations

with them, except for when they had called the house
quite a few times and I had returned a couple of phone
calls to Det. Lloyd.
Q

You did return a phone call to Det. Lloyd?

A

I returned maybe one or two, but he wasn't in

the office usually when I called, but returned phone
calls.
Q

Do you recall talking to him on the phone about

what happened at the pawn shop?
A

When he called me, yes.

Q

Do you recall when that might have been?

A

No, I don't.

Q

Could that have been in March?

A

I didn't move into the house that I am in until

the 18th of March.

He stopped by that house and I think

that is basically the only time I really talked to him on
the phone was at the new house the 18th, after the 18th
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1

of March.

2

couple of times and called, but I was never home when he

3

called the other house.

4
5

Q

I know he had stopped by at the other house a

Do you ever recall talking to him on the phone

on the 15th of March?

6

A

No, I don't.

7

Q

Does that mean it could not have occurred?

8

A

No, it does not mean that.

9

I could have

occurred but I don't recall it.

10

Q

Were you proved with a copy of a transcript?

11

A

Yes, I was.

12

Q

Of a conversation on the 15th of March?

13

A

Uh-huh.

14

Q

Have you reviewed that?

15

A

Yes, I have.

16

Q

Do you recall this conversation having taken

17

place?

18

A

No, I don't.

19

Q

Do you recall any statements you made to him as

20
21

to where the gun finally ended up?
A

I think when he came by the house, I think the

22

last couple of times, we had talked about it, where I do

23

believe it was left in Debbie's apartment.

24

sure if that is where it was, if that is where it was

25

when I moved out for sure.

But I am not

If it is there now or if it
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is at my mom's or my grandmother's or in the storage.
Q

Do you recall telling Officer Lloyd on the

phone on the 15th of March that it was left in Mark
McGrath's truck?
A

No, I don't.

Mark never touched the gun.

Neither did Cory.
Q

Do you recall telling him on the phone that you

didn't want the gun around, that you were afraid of guns?
A
don't.

I don't particularly care for guns, no, I
But I felt at the time that when I bought the gun

I needed it for my own safety of my ex-husband.
Q

Do you recall talking to him on the phone about

a conversation you had with Cory Brooks about getting rid
of the gun?
A

No, I don't.

Q

You don't recall that at all?

A

No.

Q

Are you saying that it didn't occur or you

don't recall?
A

I don't recall it occurring.

Q

Could it have occurred?

A

Anything is possible.

Q

Do you recall telling him you didn't see the

gun after you left the gun in the truck that Mark and
Cory were in?
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1
2

A

No, I don't remember telling him that because I

took that with my purse and my jacket upstairs.

3 I

Q

You say you took the gun into the house?

4

A

Uh-huh, into Debbie's apartment.

5

Q

Where did you put it from there?

6

A

I sat my jacket and my purse down on the couch.

7

Debbie came home and honked.

8

jacket and I left.

I grabbed my purse and my

9

Q

Where was the gun?

10

A

Sitting on the couch.

Then when we came home,

11

we had to go get Tera, so we was cleaning the house and I

12

put that with a bunch of my stuff in her hall closet in a

13

box, and to this day I cannot find that box.

14

missing quite a few items that Debbie will not give back.

I am still

15

Q

Did you ever show it to Debbie?

16

A

No, I didn't.

17

Q

Ever tell her you had it?

18

A

I don't recall telling her that I went and

19

bought it.

20

Q

21
22

You have any conversation with her about

purchasing that firearm?
A

After we had talked about it the first time and

23

what she told me, she thought it was a really stupid

24

idea, that was the last that it came up,

25

opinion on it.

I had heard her
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Q

Do you recall a conversation in my office where

a police officer was present?
A

I remember going to your office, but no one

else was in the office with us.

It was just you and I.

Q

Don't you recall Mr. Wells being present?

A

No, because Det. Wells left and Det. Lloyd sat

outside.
Q

Do you recall the statements that you made then

about what happened to the firearm?
A

No, I don't.
MR. BLAYLOCK:

Your Honor, I would have no

further questions of this witness.
THE COURT:

Mr. Athay.

RECROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. ATHAY:
Q

Glenda, you had many calls from the police

department, haven't you?
A

Yes, I have.

Q

Have you ever felt threatened or harassed by

them?
A

Yes, very.

We had asked if there was any way

we could put a stop to having Det. Lloyd come over and
whatnot.
Q

Who did you ask?

A

I called Reed Brown.

He is a friend of the
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1

family.

2

Q

Is he a lawyer?

3

A

He is an officer.

4

Q

Police officer?

5

A

Uh-huh, for West Valley.

6

Q

And you spoke with him?

7

A

Uh-huh.

8

He said they shouldn't be allowed to

harass.

9

Q

Tell the jury —

10

A

That it would be best if I got a lawyer.

11

MR. BLAYLOCK:

Your Honor, I think we would

12

object to the conversations with people who are not

13

present to be cross examined.

14
15

THE COURT:

It is hearsay.

It is hearsay if it is offered for

the truth of the statement, but I don't know that it is.

16

MR. ATHAY:

It is not.

17

THE COURT:

I didn't think so.

18
19
20
21

it.

I will allow

I don't see much relevance to this.
Q

(By Mr. Athay) Tell the jury and the Court what

you told Officer Brown about what you felt?
A

22

I had told him
MR. BLAYLOCK:

23

grounds of relevance.

24

either.

25

place.

~
Your Honor, I object on the

We don't have any foundation

We don't know where this conversation took
We don't know when it took place. We don't know
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who was present.

There is no foundation and it is

irrelevant.
THE COURT:
Q

Sustained.

(By Mr. Athay) You have indicated, you say, you

felt harassed in this case?
A

Yes, they had came —

Q

Just listen to my question.

Who did you feel

was harassing you?
A

Det. Lloyd and Det. Wells.

Q

And why did you feel they were harassing you?

A

Because I had told them what had happened the

last time they came around, and I told them that is all I
had to say.

That was everything.

went to Roger Blaylock's office.
of town.

And they insisted I
I had plans to go out

They told me it will only be an hour, and we

left my house before 1:00, and they told me we would only
be gone an hour.
Q

I got home that evening at 4:30.

Were you ever threatened with charges being

charged against you?
A

Yes.

Q

Unless you provided information to them?

A

They told me if I did not go up to his office

that I would be issued —

they would go get a warrant for

my arrest.
Q

Did they ever threaten to charge you with any
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1

crimes in this case?

2

A

He kept telling me they had the subject of a

3

blond being involved in this case and that they thought

4

it was me,

5

Q

6

And did they indicate what they were going to

do unless you provided information?

7

A

They told me that if I didn't go up and talk

8

with Roger Blaylock, that they would issue the warrant

9

for my arrest and that they could process me with charges

10
11
12

as being an accessory.
Q

Accessory.

Did they ever tell you they wanted

you to provide them information about Mark McGrath?

13

A

They asked questions about him.

14

Q

What kinds of questions?

15

A

Who he was, how long him and Cory had been

16

friends, why he was around my house, what he looks like,

17

who he dated.

18
19
20

Q

Did they ever instruct you you had to tell them

that Mark McGrath someway possessed this gun?
A

They told me that Mark was behind the whole

21

thing; that it wasn't Cory that they wanted.

22

Mark.

23

Q

24
25

It was

And what did you tell them in response to that?
MR. BLAYLOCK:

Your Honor, I would object as to

"they."
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THE COURT:

"They," then we are getting hearsay

in.
THE WITNESS:
Q

Det. Lloyd and Det. Wells.

(By Mr. Athay) Was there anybody present

besides Det. Lloyd and Det. Wells?
A

No, we were standing outside.

the house.

We have kids at

I didn't think they needed to be subjected to

it.
MR. BLAYLOCK:
foundation.

I will object on the grounds of

We don't know when.

MR. ATHAY:

That is my next question.

Q

(By Mr. Athay) When did this occur?

A

After they had made me go to his office.

Q

And when was that approximately?

A

It was in the summer.

Q

Summer of what year?

A

Last year.

Q

Can you pick a month?

A

I would say it was close to about this month.

Q

About this month?

A

About this month.

Q

First of June?

A

First of June.

Q

Who was present?

A

Me, Det. Wells and Det. Lloyd.

It was nice and warm.
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1

Q

No one else?

2

A

Everybody else was inside of my house.

3

Q

And as a result of that conversation, you felt

4

threatened?

5

A

Yes.

6

Q

Did you feel intimidated?

7

A

Yes, I felt like they were trying to scare me.

8

Q

Did you feel harassed?

9

A

Yes.

10

Q

As a result of that, you went to Officer Brown;

11
12
13

is that correct?
A

Yes, I did.

I called my dad and he told me to

come out and we would sit down and talk to Reed Brown.

14

Q

Did you ever call anyone else?

15

A

Then Reed suggested that we get me a lawyer, so

16

I did.

17

Q

Who was that lawyer?

18

A

David McPhie.

19

Q

Did you ever have occasion to call my office

20
21

and complain about your treatment?
A

I called a couple of times, I do believe, but

22

you weren't in.

23

couple of times.

24
25

Q

I got your secretary, I believe, a

Did you have a conversation with myself and my

secretary about this harassment?
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A

I did talk to you about how —

could make me go.

I asked if they

If they could have made me go down

there without the warrant.
Q

Do you recall when that conversation was, the

one you had with me and my secretary?
A

I don't recall a month.

I know it was last

year.
Q

Was it after the incident that you have

described, that with Det. Wells and Det. Lloyd?
A

Yes, it was.

Q

Did you advise me you felt harassed,

intimidated and threatened?
A

Yes.
MR. ATHAY:

I have no further questions.

THE COURT:

Mr. Blaylock.

MR. BLAYLOCK:

Yes, I do have a couple of quick

questions.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION CONTINUED
BY MR. BLAYLOCK:
Q

Glenda, you said you told them the first time

what had happened.

What did you tell the police had

happened?
A

I told them that I had went with Cory and Mark,

and Mark and Cory had drove me down to pick up the gun.
So I could buy a gun and they dropped me off at Debbie's.

155

APPENDIX III
Jury Inquiry about Instructions Nos. 1 & 13 (R. 182)
Jury Instructions Nos. 1 & 13
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR

Dc t : l j,'

SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY

Plaintiff,

CRIMINAL NO. 911901762 FS
JUDGE RICHARD H. MOFFAT

vs.
MARK EDWARD MCGRATH,
Defendant.

INSTRUCTION NO. 1
You are instructed that the defendant

MARK EDWARD MCGRATH,

is charged by the information which has been duly filed with the
commission

of

THEFT

BY

RECEIVING

STOLEN

PROPERTY.

The

Information alleges:

THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY, a Second Degree Felony,
at 13371 South Redwood Road, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
on or about January 29, 1991, in violation of Title 76, Chapter
6, Section 408, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that
the defendant, MARK EDWARD MCGRATH, a party to the offense,
received, retained or disposed of property, aided in concealing,
selling or withholding the property of Stephanie Vert, knowing
the property had been stolen, with the purpose to deprive the
owner thereof, and that at the time of the theft MARK EDWARD
MCGRATH was armed with a dangerous weapon, to-wit: a gun, and
that the value of said property exceeded $1,000.00.

INSTRUCTION NO.

'^

Before you can convict the defendant, Mark Edward McGrath,
of the offense of Theft by Receiving Stolen Property as charged
in the information, you must find from all of the evidence and
beyond a reasonable doubt each and every one of the following
elements of that offense:
1.

That on or about the 29th day of January, 1991, in Salt

Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant, Mark Edward McGrath,
received, retained or disposed of the property of another; and
2.

That the defendant knew that said property had been

stolen or believed that said property had been stolen; and
3.

That the defendant received, retained or disposed of

said property with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof; and
4.

That said property had a value that exceeded $1,000.00.

If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in
this case, you are convinced of the truth of each and every one
of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you
must

find the defendant guilty of Theft by Receiving Stolen

Property as charged in the information.

If, on the other hand,

you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or
more of the foregoing elements, then you must find the defendant
not guilty.
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